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Abstract—This work studies how the communication network
between proactive consumers affects the power utilization and
fairness in a simplified direct-current micro-grid model, com-
posed by three coupled layers: physical (an electric circuit that
represents a micro-grid), communication (a peer-to-peer net-
work within the micro-grid) and regulatory (individual decision
strategies). Our results show that, for optimal power utilization
and fairness, a global knowledge about the system is needed,
demonstrating the importance of a micro-grid aggregator to
inform about the power consumption for different time periods.
Index Terms—Communication networks, Agents-based sys-
tems, Network topology, Smart grids, Decision making.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of communication networks within the electric
power grid allows for different new applications to its end-
users [1]. This, on its turn, increases the complexity involved
in the management of such a system. In this context, there is a
need to develop models that aim at capturing new features that
might emerge [2], as for example synchronization of individual
behaviors due to signals and incentive structures. Game theory
illustrates one approach that can capture such features since it
is able to model strategic interactions of individual agents. It
is worth mentioning that this theory was firstly introduced to
model distributed economic relations, but is now widespread
within other research communities (e.g. [3], [4] and references
therein).
The present work focuses on electricity micro-grids (specific
region that can be self-sustained in relation to the large power
grid, e.g. isolated rural areas with local energy generation)
and is related to the numerous studies done on the fields of
economics [5], power systems [6], [7] and communication sys-
tems [8]. Here we follow the ideas presented in [9], where the
authors pointed out some limitations of the standard economic
models for energy systems while indicating the importance
of complexity science approaches. Like some articles as [6],
[7], [10], [11], we incorporate here aspects from different
fields to include how peer interactions or collective individual
actions may affect the macro-level outcomes as in gossip-
based algorithms or electricity markets.
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To do so, we use an agent-based model, recently proposed
by the authors in [12], to model agents’ interactions within
a system constituted of three layers (physical, communication
and regulatory, to be explained later) and then obtain a better
understanding of both the inter- and intra-layer dynamics.
We therefore expect to provide a different perspective about
demand-side management policies [13]–[16] that goes beyond
individual utility maximization and purely competitive strate-
gies (usual assumptions of many economic researches [9]).
In specific terms, we extend our previous model of a
fully distributed system operation by introducing an entity
that provides a centralized signal. This was motivated by
the demand control problem in direct current (DC) micro-
grids. We consider three different scenarios related to how
information is shared among consumers: no signaling (similar
to [12]), global state signaling and pricing scheme. The first
strategy is fully distributed, while the other two require an
entity with global state information about the whole system;
this entity is the micro-grid aggregator. Our main contribution
is to assess these different demand-side management policies
(without or with micro-grid aggregator) in both micro and
macro levels looking at the agent decision dynamics and
considering different communication network topologies. It is
worth mentioning the present paper is the first attempt to study
micro-grids using the model introduced in [12].
Our model is described as follows. The physical layer (a
DC micro-grid) is a circuit composed by a power source
and resistors in parallel. Individual agents (the proactive con-
sumers, the “prosumers”) can add, remove or keep the resistors
they have. Agents’ decisions aim at maximizing their own
delivered power, which is a non-linear function dependent on
the others’ behavior, and they are based on (i) their internal
state, (ii) their global state perception, (iii) the information
received from their neighbors in the communication network,
and (iv) a randomized selfishness related to their willingness
of answering to a demand-side control request. Different peer-
to-peer communication network topologies and randomized
communication errors in the deployment of micro-grids are
important aspects to be included as in [17], [18]. But differ-
ently from other papers, we analyze here their systemic effects;
for detailed results of communication network implementation
in power grids using, for instance, spatial and/or temporal
spectrum sharing, refer to [19]–[23].
Looking at the proposed model, by individually modifying
the peer-to-peer communication network topology and the
demand-side management policies keeping fixed the other
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2TABLE I
NOTATIONS
Notation Meaning
t P Z discrete time
A “ t1, 2, ..., Nu set of agents; N is the system size
Aztiu set A without agent i
i P A agent i
Ni Ă A neighborhood set of agent i
nrts P tN,N ` 1, ...u active number of resistors at t
airts P N` active resistors of agent i
rirts “ nrts ´ airts active resistors excluding agent i
Pirts ą 0 agent i consumed power [units of power]
λirts P R gain in power of agent i
λmin P R system-wide predefined minimum gain
Sirts P t´1, 0,`1u agent i’s state: `1 (defect),
0 (ignore), or ´1 (cooperate)
si P r0, 1s selfishness gene of agent i
perr P r0, 1s error probability in a communication link
cavg P r0, 1s average value of cooperating agents
R resistor value added as a load by agents
RV source resistor
parameters including the link error probability, we expect to
show how these factors affect the power utilization and fairness
in the system for different number of agents. Note that our
study assumes that each one of those three layers (physical,
communication and regulatory) is equally important to deter-
mine the system dynamics and the individuals’ (re)actions. In
this case, the system can neither be reduced to one or two of
these layers nor the dynamics of the whole system cannot be
assessed based on individual (typical) agents.
Our previous results in [12] can be seen as the benchmark
scenario where no demand-side management is considered;
there we showed: (i) different communication network topolo-
gies (ring and Watt-Strogatz-Graph [24]) lead to different
levels of power utilization and fairness at the physical layer
and (ii) a certain level of error induces more cooperative
behavior at the regulatory layer. Now, if demand-side control
or pricing schemes are considered, which is the focus of
the present work, the system behaves in a more predictable
manner and is less dependent on its size. In this case, the
global knowledge about the system state enables much higher
utilization and fairness, which indicates the need of an entity to
guide the peer relations. It is important to say that, although
there is a wide understanding that global signaling leads to
more stable outcomes, this is not always the case; many times
global signaling induces destabilizing collective behavior (e.g.
[25] and references therein).
The rest of this paper is divided as follows. Section II
describes the multi-layer model employed here. Section III
presents the numerical results used to analyze the proposed
scenario. In Section IV, we discuss the lessons learned from
our model, indicating potential future works. The most impor-
tant symbols are presented in Table I.
II. MULTI-LAYER MODEL
A. Background
The power grid has been thought as a one-way network,
where the generators produce the electricity that needs to travel
long distances in high-voltage transmission lines to arrive
at the distribution network, which delivers the electricity to
final consumers [2], [12]. However, in order to integrate ever
increasing wind and solar power, this network has to change in
many ways. First, solar and wind energy need more physical
space than classical power plants, since they are not just
transforming energy from one high density form to another,
but rather collecting low density energy while distilling it in
to a high density form. Second, they will produce energy in a
much less predictable and/or consistent way.
This volatility in supply means that the consumption and
distribution need to react to these changes, either though
storing energy or shifting consumption in time. In this case,
automation is needed to balance the system; therefore, the
so-called smart grids are planned to heavily use informa-
tion and communication technologies (ICTs) to collect and
take autonomous actions. Communication technologies should
then enable the grid to use electricity from diverse sources
whenever they are available, delivering to wherever they are
needed. This would improve the efficiency of both production
and distribution since the smart grid is designed to provide
the necessary capabilities to enhance the reliability of energy
infrastructures, and decrease the impact of supply disruptions,
as well as create new services and applications.
To achieve the needed degree of automation to integrate
volatile energy sources, the power grid needs to be coupled
with the communication network. This creates a codepen-
dency, where the power grid will only work when the com-
munication system is working, which in turn will only work if
the power system is working. Furthermore, the volatility of the
power sources demands a new interaction paradigm between
producers and consumers. Consumers need to react to changes
in the supply, by shifting their demand, whenever possible, to
synchronize with production. This means that the smart grid
will also be much more coupled to a regulatory layer, which
will influence consumer behavior and decisions.
In summary, more than any specific technological challenge
existing in the generation, transmission and distribution, a
proper smart grid model should include the following different
layers of analysis.
‚ Physical electricity grids that include intermittent
sources of energy (e.g. solar panels or wind turbines),
micro-grids and mobile batteries/loads (e.g electric ve-
hicles). The energy interchange occurs in this layer,
transported in form of electricity.
‚ Information networks to acquire, process and dissem-
inate information respecting the specific application re-
quirements. The communication between agents happens
in this layer, which can be seen as the agent reality
(i.e. the agent only knows about itself and whatever is
communicated to it).
‚ Regulatory layer or markets where consumers and
operators can interchange electricity, evolving differ-
ent strategies under different exchange regulations. This
layer therefore include the socio-economical context and
decision-making processes, which directly affects the
physical layer.
Instead of analyzing each one of them separately, consider-
ing the others as given (the most usual approach), this research
will model these three layers as constitutive parts of the smart
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Fig. 1. (a) Electrical circuit representing the physical layer of the system. The circuit is composed by a power source V and RV, and resistors of R in parallel,
generating a current I . These resistors are related to N agents that can add, remove or keep the resistors under their control in the circuit. The minimum
number of resistors an agent can have is one and there is no maximum. We also consider N as the size of the system. (b) The agents are connected in a
communication network so that a given agent has access to the information related to the previous action of their first-order neighbours. In the ring topology
illustrated here, every agent is connected with two other agents. In this case agent i is connected with agents i ´ 1 and i ` 1 with i “ 1, 2, ..., N . In the
ring topology, agents 1 and N are neighbors. (c) At time step t, the normalized power delivered Pallrts{Ptyp to the agents with rising number of resistors
nrts in the system, where Ptyp “ V 2RV and Pallrts “
ř
iPA Pirts with Pirts given by equation (1). (d) The decision tree representing the decision making
process of each agent for each round.
grid system. By doing so, we will be able to provide a deeper
understanding of the smart grid spatio-temporal multi-layer
dynamics and the emergent systemic features that arise from
them. It is important to say that this proposal is built upon the
assumption that effective cross-layer management strategies
targeting the realization of the ambitious goals planned for
the smart grids can be only realized if the way that the system
elements interact within one layer and across different layers
is properly characterized.
This approach is philosophically inspired by the Rus-
sian/Soviet tradition of reflexive systems and control [26].
Such a perspective in their current version has two funda-
mental aspects captured by our model: the importance of the
information layer as the filter of the physical reality, and the
reflexive effects of agents and contexts that they take their
decisions. In other words, what individual agents perceive is
as important as (or even more important than) what is actually
happening in the physical layer. Their individual decisions
at the regulatory layer, in turn, depend on a combination
from their own internal state and their own perceptions of
4the system state. The individual decisions, which are built
upon different perspectives, will determine the physical layer
dynamics, which shall affect the future decisions of individual
agents (i.e. reflexive behavior).
In practical terms, the present work is a multi-layer model
of DC micro-grids, as part of smart grids, that considers also
peer-to-peer exchange of information within a network with
different topology; this model will be briefly described in the
following. Our discrete-time, agent-based model assumes these
three layers as constitutive parts of the system composed by
an electric circuit as the micro-grid physical infrastructure, a
communication network where agents exchange local informa-
tion and a set of regulations that define the agents’ behavior,
as exemplified in Fig. 1. It is worth saying that this model
– as any other model – is a clear simplification of the real
grid. Our goal here is to put light on the systemic multi-layer
dynamics, which is most often neglected.
B. Agents’ decision process
As stated before the model assumes discrete time steps,
denoted by t. Therefore, the interactions between agents might
be viewed as a round-based game [27] based in the state Sirts,
defined at Table I and discussed later on. At each step in time
t, every agent aims to maximize its own consumed power. To
achieve this goal, the agent has three options:
‚ Add a resistor R (defecting);
‚ Remove a resistor R (cooperating); or
‚ Do nothing (ignoring).
We assume that the value of R is fixed and the same for all
agents. Our preliminary investigation indicated that relaxing
this assumption within a reasonable range of values has no
significant effects on the system dynamics; then, we decided
to use the homogeneous case for simplicity.
The decision is based on the gain from the previous strategy
Sirt´1s in order to decide its new state Sirts in the following
manner. If the gain λirt ´ 1s is greater than or equal to a
system-wide predefined minimum λmin, the agent continues
to its (successful) strategy at time t, i.e. Sirts “ Sirt´ 1s.
If λirts ă λmin, then agent i compares its strategy with
its neighborhood Ni, which is related to the communication
network and will be defined later in this section.
In the case that a majority of the neighborhood is cooperat-
ing, e.g.
ř
jPNi Sjrt´1s ă 0, this will appear to agent i as an
indication that the system is in a condition of overusing. The
agent will then also change to a cooperative state, leading to
Sirts “ ´1. Otherwise, the agent decision will be related to its
individual selfishness as follows: a random number between 0
and 1 is drawn to be compared to its own selfishness gene si
in order to decide whether it will start cooperating or not. Each
agent is assigned with selfishness gene at the beginning of the
simulation, which is also a random number between 0 and 1. In
the case of not cooperating, another random number is drawn
and once again compared to the selfishness gene si, but now
to decide if stays inactive (i.e. Sirts “ 0) or adds another load
in the circuit (i.e. Sirts “ `1). The agent decision procedure
is shown in Fig. 1 (d).
C. Communication network
The communication network enables agent i to know the
state Sjrt ´ 1s of the agents j P Ni which are in his
neighborhood. We assume that agent j always transmits its
actual state Sjrts to agent i. However, the communication
links can also experience errors. An error event means the
received message by agent i contains a different information
than agent j has sent. So that if SjÑirt ´ 1s “ Sjrt ´ 1s is
the state information send from j to i and SˆjÑirt´ 1s be the
information received by i.
We assume that error events are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) such that the probability of the event:
Pr
”
SˆjÑirt´ 1s ‰ SjÑirt´ 1s
ı
“ perr for all t P Z, i P A
and j P Ni, Prr¨s refers to the probability that a given event
occurs. The network is a bidirectional graph so that an error
at i Ñ j does not imply an error at j Ñ i, and vice-versa.
If an error happens, the received information SˆjÑirt ´ 1s is
assumed to be i.i.d. between the other possible states.
In this study we compare two different communication
networks [24]:
‚ Ring: Each agent connects to exactly two other nodes to
form a ring. It is a simple deterministic topology. The
agents have then the same degree.
‚ Watt-Strogatz-Graph: Random graph that has small-
world properties, namely short average path lengths and
high clustering. In this case, the agents have, in average,
similar degrees.
We did not consider here Barabasi-Albert graphs since the
scenario under investigation presents a similar macro-level
behavior to Watts-Strogatz, as shown in [12].
D. Physical system
In the physical systems as presented in Fig. 1, there exists an
optimal number of resistors that leads to the maximum power
delivered from the source to the agents. If the delivered power
is below the maximum on the right, then there will be a gain
by removing a resistor until the system has reached such point.
Conversely, if it is below on the left, then there will be a gain
by adding a resistor.
One may ask the following question: Is it possible for the
agents to reach the optimal point with limited knowledge about
the system? In the presence of a central controller this would
be a fairly easy problem. First, we need to find the number
of resistors that leads to optimal power to then distribute
them among the agents. This kind of solution resembles time
division schemes in computer networks or cellular systems
[28]. However, as discussed before, in the absence of a
centralized controlling entity, the agents only have a limited
knowledge about other agents.
In any case, the agents have some information about the
state of the system based on their own power consumption
and the decision done. At time-step t, the power each agent
consumes Pirts with i P A “ t1, ..., Nu and is given by:
Pirts “ Ptyp airtsµpaavgrts ` µq2 , (1)
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Fig. 2. On the left: change in the average cooperation cavg depending on the system size N . On the right: examples of a typical system behavior as a
function of time t where the points (pixels) represent the agent state Sirts such that red means defection, white cooperation, and black = doing nothing for
N “ 1000 (top), N “ 100 (middle) and N “ 10 (bottom). The system parameters are: λmin “ 0.0005, RV “ 2 Ω, R0 “ R{N “ 200 Ω, perr “ 0.01
and V “ 1 V. The communication network is configured as Watts-Strogatz graph.
where Ptyp “ V 2RV , µ “ RRV , airts is the number of active
resistors the agent i possesses, rirts is the number of active
resistors in the system excluding the source resistor RV and
the ones controlled by agent i, and aavgrts “ pairts`rirtsq{N .
The physical system is then described by its size N , the
ratio µ of the resistance values and the power source V . The
resistors are scaled so that the optimal average number of
resistors
`
aa˚vg
˘
is independent of N while the voltage might
be scaled with
?
N to have a constant ratio of power per
agent, as explained later on. The gain that agent i experiences
at time-step t is then defined as:
λirts “ Pirts ´ Pirt´ 1s
Pirt´ 1s
“ ∆Pi
Pirt´ 1s . (2)
This implies that the agents only use the information about
the previous time-step t ´ 1. If we expand (2) using (1),
the resulting equation that determines λirts becomes more
complicated. To make the analysis clearer, we choose to apply
the following approximation:
λirts « dPi
Pirts
« ∆airts
airts ´
2
N
1
aavgrts ` µ p∆rirts `∆airtsq , (3)
such that the gain λirts is now a function of the variations in
agent i’s own number of resistors ∆airts “ airts´airt´1s and
in the number of resistors controlled by other agents ∆rirts “
rirts ´ rirt ´ 1s, as well as the average number of resistors
aavgrts and the system parameters N and µ.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present our main results. We first revisit
the results introduced in [12] where no demand-side manage-
ment signaling is considered and the agents try to achieve
a global optimum solely based in their local information.
We then present our new results evaluating the effects of
such factors on the system dynamics in comparison with our
baseline model. Once again, it is important to say that the
numerical results to be presented only exemplify the impact
of different ways of signaling on the multi-layer system dy-
namics. Although qualitative changes are expected to happen
consistently, the actual numerical values depend on the actual
signal construction.
A. Baseline model
In Fig. 2 one can see the inherent dynamics of the system
when no demand-side management is done and the communi-
cation network topology is a random graph. We identify two
phenomena that are important for our analysis, as explained
next.
First, we see that the average number of cooperators varies
with the size of the system, showing a very high number of
cooperation for larger systems. However, as we will see later in
Fig. 2, this is not sufficient to understand the system dynamics.
This high level of cooperation is not necessarily a universally
good outcome.
The second phenomena is a change in behavior of the
system for different sizes. While for small systems we see
an almost checkerboard like distribution of white (coopera-
tion) and black (defection) dots, mid-sized systems show a
strikingly different image, in this case we now see a wave-
like pattern where a large front of cooperation establishes and
then suddenly brakes down. This is again in contrast to the
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Fig. 3. Typical behavior of very small (N “ 5), small (N “ 10), medium (N “ 100) and large systems (N “ 1000). The small systems can operate much
closer to the optimum, while mid-size systems show big jumps after stable periods. The system parameters are λmin “ 0.005, RV “ 2 Ω, R0 “ R{N “
200 Ω, perr “ 0.01 and V “ 1 V. The communication network is configured as a ring.
picture for large systems where the behavior is dominated by
cooperation with some sparsely distributed red dots.
The resulting changes in the power delivery can be seen
in Fig. 3, which shows that only very small systems of less
then 10 agents are able to stay very close to the optimum,
while systems of more then 10 agents start to deviate from
it. These curves also reflect the wave-like behavior for mid-
sized systems, where the number resistors drops due to almost
global cooperation. This brings the system close to the optimal
point, when the number of resistors rises once again. For large
systems, it does not get close to the optimum. However, it is
more stable and predictable than the other cases.
The background of how this global behavior emerges from
the local interactions is found in our previous work [12].
Here, we will view this intrinsic unstable performance as a
undesirable outcome. In the next subsection, we will explore
ways to prevent this behaviors by using demand-side signaling
with different communication topologies. As we will see later,
our goal is to provide a global indication via either direct
signaling or pricing so the agents can use this information to
make their individual decisions.
B. Demand-side management and the micro-grid aggregator
Let us first define the power utilization Putil as the fraction
of power that is utilized by the system and the available power:
Putil “ 4
Ptyp
ÿ
iPA
Pi,avg, (4)
where Pi,avg is the time average power of agent i computed
as:
Pi,avg “ lim
TÑ8
1
T
T´1ÿ
t“0
Pirts. (5)
The first demand-side management policy is based on a
global signal that every agent receives and labeled signal in the
figures. In Fig. 4, we can see the results of such a global signal
that is sent to all agents when the system is beyond the optimal
point. The results are shown in comparison to the base case,
labeled “basic graph” as presented in the previous subsection.
This signal might be interpreted as a way for a micro-grid
operator to implement a demand response mechanism when
the system is experiencing a peak in consumption, while
supply is very limited. Such a system are already found in
the reality. As discussed in [29], the Scottish Island Eigg uses
a traffic light system to signal its inhabitants the state of supply
in the micro-grid.
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Fig. 4. Power utilization for different communication strategies and topologies
depending on the system. The green line shows the utilization for the basic
model. The red and brown lines are from the simulations with global demand
response signal.
From the agents’ view, this signal provides a global informa-
tion about the system so they do not have to rely only on their
neighbors. This global information is assumed to be reliable
and is treated in the same way as the neighbor information: if
the signal is present and the agent experiences a small gain,
it starts cooperating.
As we can see in Fig. 4, the signal enables the system
to reach the optimum point seems independent from its size.
This contrasts with the original system, where on average is
not possible for any size to reach such high states of power
utilization, regardless of the communication network topology.
The second demand-side management policy is the intro-
duction of a two-stage real time price for all agents. For this
purpose, we have to adapt our model further. Instead of just
maximizing its own power demand, the agents now have to
maximize their utility value taking the price into account.
The price function needs to reflect the state of the system as
a signal of overuse (when necessary). In order to build such a
function, we first need to build an utility function that reflects
how the power demand is valued. We adopted the following
utility from [30], [31]:
UαpPirts, ωiq “
#
ωPi ´ α2P 2i if 0 ď Pi ă ωα
ω2
2α if Pi ě ωα
,
where Pi being the power consumption while α and ω
determine how consumption is valued.
The function is chosen so that there exists a linear marginal
benefit up to a certain point, at which the benefit does not
increase anymore with higher consumption. In our case, we
keep α fixed at 0.2 while ωi is uniformly distributed between
2.05˘ 0.05, representing different values of consumers about
the importance of power consumption.
The price function, meanwhile, is modeled as a simple step
function:
prts “
#
p1 if nrts ď nopt
p2 if nrts ą nopt ,
assuming that p1 “ 0.2 and p2 “ 5.
The cost for each user is then calculated by multiplying the
consumption with the current price:
cirts “ prtsPirts.
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Fig. 5. Power utilization for step pricing and agents with utility function
described in this section. The green line shows the utilization for the basic
model.
The agent decision process itself is similar, but now, in-
stead of optimizing the received power, the agents are now
optimizing their benefit (the utility minus the cost):
birts “ UαpPirts, ωiq ´ cirts.
The results using the proposed scheme can be viewed in Fig.
5. We can once again see that the results are much better than
the one presented in Section III-A. However, if we compare the
case of a simple ring graph (brown curve, labeled “util ring”)
describing the neighborhood versus a more meshed topology
from Watts-Strogatz graph (green, labeled “util graph”), the
communication network (where local information about the
neighbors are transmitted) has still a an influence on the final
outcome. This effect seems to be more pronounced for small
networks. However, mid-sized systems, which are the most
critical size when no signaling is considered, still experience
stable outcomes, comparable to the global signal policy.
IV. DISCUSSION AND FINAL REMARKS
In our previous contribution [12], we showed that a simple
direct current micro-grid system composed by three con-
stituent layers (physical, informational and regulatory) may
present emergent dynamics at macro-level. This kind of very
unpredictable behavior that arises is normally undesirable
to manage the system and is related to a lack of global
information. This paper shows that it is possible to counteract
this behavior when some kind of global signaling based on the
micro-grid aggregator. One strategy is to send direct signals
to end-users when the micro-grid is overused, while the other
is a indirect signal through a price function.
The first strategy is a rather simple way of providing
each agent with global information about micro-grid aggre-
gate power consumption. This strategy enables a more stable
outcome, which is much less influenced by other parameters
of the simulation, like the communication network topology.
The second strategy in its turn maps the original power op-
timization into a cost-benefit optimization, where each agents
wants to achieve the individual optimal power usage consid-
ering price and utility value of the consumed power. While
similar outputs could be demonstrated with this approach, it is
necessary to point out that the choice of parameters to achieve
a stable outcome in the scenario is much more complicated. In
8the non-trivial cases, where the sum of the demanded power of
all agents exceeds the maximum available power, the outcome
is highly dependent on the choice of not only the price levels
but also the valuation of the power given by the variables α
and ωi.
These facts suggest that real time pricing in combination
with demand response, which is often proposed as the way to
utilize changes in available power, needs to be finely tuned in
order to achieve a stable outcome. In other words, pricing
does not inherently guarantee optimal usage and stability
for the micro-grid. Rather, the outcome of the first strategy
indicates that a direct response to capacity constraints without
the intermediate pricing layer is much easier to implement in a
stable manner. In any case, our results reinforce the importance
of the micro-grid aggregator as a signaler of the global system
state information for a stable peer relation between prosumers
in the micro-grid. We expect to further develop this simulation
by adding generation capabilities in the prosumers together
with a more complete market description, as indicated by our
initial results [32].
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